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In this paper, we estimate the size and the evolution of the Romanian shadow economy in the period 
1998Q1-2008Q4, using a vector error correction model. A special attention it was given to the problem of 
non-stationarity and cointegration. The results indicate that the shadow economy grows constantly during 
1998-1999 until it reaches its maximum at the end of 1999(38.12% in 1999Q2). Then, it decreases slowly 
and stabilizes around 27% of official GDP. 
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I. Introduction  
Although the problem of informality is not new, an agreement on a unique accepted definition, as 
well as a measuring method are still missing. Portes et al. (1989) defines the informal economy as 
“a process of income-generation characterized by one central feature: it is unregulated by the 
institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated.” 
Schneider  (1998,  2002,  2004,  2005,  2006,  2007)  realizes  various  estimations  of  the  size  of 
shadow economy in Romania using the electricity method and obtains about 26% of official GDP 
for  the  period  1990/93,  and  28.3%  in  1994/95.Applying  the  currency  demand  approach  and 
DYMIMIC  model,  Romania  have  an ascending  trend  on the  terms  of the  shadow  economy, 
registering 27.3% of official GDP in 1990/93, 33.4% in 2000/01 and 37.4% in 2002/03.In the last 
years, it can be observed a decreasing evolution of the shadow economy, who registers 36.2% of 
official GDP in 2003/04 and 35.4% in 2004/05. 
Using discrepancy between actual and desired income and between declared and actual income 
method,  Albu  L.(2007,  2008)  estimates  the  lower  and  upper  bound  of  the  shadow 
economy:(28.6-35.9)% of official GDP in 1990, (23.5-28.7)% in 1995, (22.5-27.3)% in 2004 and 
(22.5-27.8)% in 2005. 
In this paper, we will focus on measuring the size and evolution of informality in Romania, in 
order to contribute to the understanding of the interaction and effects of the shadow economy. In 
order to do so, we used a classic currency demand approach, going back in time as much as data 
constraints  allowed  us. The  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  section  II,  we  provide  a  brief 
description of the currency demand approach. Section III summarizes the data and methodology 
and present the results for the vector error correction model (VECM). In section IV we used the 
VEC estimates to compute the size of shadow economy in Romania.  
 
II.The currency demand approach 
Applied to many OECD countries365, this approach is one of the most commonly used 
indirect approaches. It was first used by Cagan (1958), who calculated a correlation of 
                                                       
365 Schneider (1997, 1998a), Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998a), Williams and Windebank (1995) and 
Bovi and Dell’Anno(2007) for OECD countries, Tanzi(1983) for USA, Bovi and Castelucci(2001) for Italy, Giles D.E. 624 
 
the currency demand and the tax pressure (as one cause of the shadow economy) for the 
United States over the period 1919 to 1955. Cagan’s approach was further developed by 
Tanzi366 (1980, 1983), who econometrically estimated a currency demand function for 
the United States for the period 1929 to 1980 in order to calculate the shadow economy. 
Following Cagan’s work, a typical currency demand function can be written as: 
) exp( ) 1 ( 0 0 i Y A C g
b a - Q + =    (1) 
0 C is the observed cash,Q the variable that gives incentives to make hidden transactions. This is 
the  key  variable  of  all  currency  models  and  it  can  be  approximated  using  government 
consumption normalized by GDP, tax rates (direct and indirect taxes), tax revenues to GDP, 0 Y
the registered GDP,  A , , , g b a parameters. Estimating equation (1), it will be obtained C ˆ .Setting 
the  incentive  variable  Q  equal  to  zero,  and  leaving  the  coefficients  of  the  other  variables 
unchanged, we obtainC ~
.The difference between C ˆ  and C ~
 is the amount of extra currency that 
measures the amount of illegal money in the economy. Forth more, assuming that the velocity of 
money is the same in both forma and informal sector, we can obtain an estimate of the size of 
informal economy multiplying illegal money ( C C EC ~ ˆ - = ) by the velocity of money (
C
Y
v = ). 
 
III. Methodology and Data 
The data cover each quarter between 1998 and 2008: the number of observations is 44. The main 
sources used to collect the data are: Eurostat, National Bank of Romania and National Institute of 
Statistics, Tempo database. A description of the variables and their sources is summarized in the 
table 1 of Appendix. As point out by Guissari (1987), one of the first decisions to be taken in a 
currency demand model is how to deflate the currency series. Spiro (1996) considers the use of 
monetary  aggregate  M2  inadequate,  since  it  contains  amounts  that  correspond  to  long-term 
wealth accumulation, while currency is used mainly for transaction processes. So, we deflate the 
series using the national GDP deflator and we construct the following function
367: 
t t t t t t Wages R Tax Y C e b b b b b + × + × + × + × + = 4 3 2 1 0  (2) 
This specification captures the long-run relationships between the explanatory variables and the 
currency demand. Regarding the sign of the variables in the model, we expect a positive impact 
on currency demand for GDP, taxes and wages ( 4 2 1 , , b b b >0)
368, and a negative effect from the 
part of interest rate ( 3 b <0)
369.Before proceeding with the estimation, each series is individually 
examined under the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative of stationarity. As shown 
                                                                                                                                                               
(1999) for New Zeeland, Brambila Macias Jose( 2008) for Mexico, Schneider(1986) for Denmark, Schneider and 
Hametner(2007) for Colombia. 
366 The basic regression equation for the currency demand, proposed by Tanzi (1983), is the following: 
 
 
ln denotes natural logarithms, 
C/M2 is the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts, 
TW is a weighted average tax rate (to proxy changes in the size of the shadow economy), 
367 This function is a log-linearization of equation (1). 
368 The expected positive impact of taxes on currency demand can be interpreted, following Tanzi: if the level of 
taxation  increase,  economic  agents  will  be  encourage  engaging  tax-evading  activities,  using  currency,  due  to  the 
intractability of cash, and than the currency rises. 
369 If the interest rate increases, the economic agents get ride to their currency holdings. 625 
 
in table 2 of Appendix all most all the series turn out to be non-stationary and integrated of order 
1. 
In Engle-Granger two-step approach (Engle, Granger, 1987) we verify the cointegration of the 
variables, estimating least square regression with variables in level:  
t t t t t t Wages R Tax Y C e b b b b b + × + × + × + × + = 4 3 2 1 0  
Using  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  test,  we  analyze  the  assumed  cointegration  relationship’s 
residuals t e . If the causal variables are cointegrated with the dependent variable, we expect the 
ADF test to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root against the alternative for the error term t e .In 
fact,  we  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis  at  10%  level  and  we  conclude  that  the  causes  are 
cointegrated with the dependent variable (table 3 of appendix). Because all series turn out to be 
strongly  non-stationary  and  integrated  on  the  same  order,  I(1),  we  also  apply  the  Johansen 
cointegrating test. Trace tests on one hand indicate three cointegrating equations at the 5% level 
and one at the 1% level, while the eigenvalue test indicates one cointegrating equation at the 1% 
level  (table  4  of  appendix).  This  allows  us  to  conclude  that  there  exists  one  cointegration 
relationship
370. 
Given  the  non-stationarity  of  our  series  and  the  presence  of  a  common  stochastic  trend, 
traditional estimation methods are ruled out. So, in order to estimate equation(2) and measure the 
size of the informal sector, we tackle the problem using a vector correction model(VECM).This 
type of models present a series of improvements with respect cu standard approaches, allowing 
us to analyze short and long-run effects. 
The VECM estimated can be defined as follows:  
t t t t Y Y Y e d + × P + D × G + = D - - 1 1  (3) 
where Y is a vector formed by the n variables used in our currency demand model(C, Y, TAX, R, 
and  WAGES). P G,   are  5 5´ matrices  made  up  by  system  coefficients.  If  the  rank  of 
cointegration r is less than n, then  ' gb = P , where g represents the adjustment coefficients and 
b the cointegrating vectors;  e corresponds to residuals and  d is a constant term which can be 
separated in two parts-a trend term and the intercept-in the cointegrating relation.  
As expected, the estimated model which corresponds to equation (2), the coefficients for output, 
tax burden and wages have a positive long-run effect, while interest rate take the pressure off on 
currency demand. All coefficients are strongly significant and assign relevant weight to GDP 
with a coefficient of 1.706 and taxes with 3.95.  
 
   
                                                       
370  The  existence  of  only  one  cointegration  vector  in  our  system  means  that  there  is  a  long-run  equilibrium 
relationship between C, Y, R, TAX and WAGES. 626 
 
 





























IV. The size of informal economy 
After estimating the vector error correction model (VECM)
372 and obtaining the coefficients for 
the long-run relationship of equation (2), we proceed to estimate the size of shadow economy. In 
order to obtain an estimate of the size of the shadow economy, we compute  C ˆ using all the 
coefficients  in  equation  (4).Then,  we  set  the  tax  variable  equal  to  zero  and  re-estimate  the 




The difference between these two variables-C ˆ  and C ~
-give the amount of extra currency 
(EC) in the economy. Following Tanzi (1983), we assume equal velocity in both the 






Equation (5) yields the velocity of money in the Romanian economy. Y is the gross domestic 
product,  1 M corresponds to total currency and deposits in circulation and extra currency (EC) for 
extra currency or illegal currency. The difference between  1 M  and EC can be interpreted as the 
amount of legal money used in economy. Once we estimate the velocity from equation (5), the 
dimension of shadow economy using the currency demand approach can be obtained multiplying 
EC by the velocity of money:  
ormal Y v EC inf = *  (6) 
Using equation (6), we can infer the size of informal sector in formal GDP terms. From the table 
of  normalized  cointegrating  coefficients,  the  coefficient  of  gross  domestic  product(Y)  in  the 
model  is  different  from  1.Following  the  Ahumada  et  al.  (2006),  we  proceed  to  correct  our 
estimates using their suggested  
                                                       
371 All variables are in natural logs. All series used are I(1).The complete details and the analysis as well as the matrix 
of adjustment coefficients can be found in the appendix. The number of lags in the model was determined using the 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and Quinn 
information  criterion  (HQIC).The  model  was  estimated  using  two  lags  and  it  assume  one  cointegrating  equation. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 5% level. 
372 The long-run relationship between our variables was derived normalizing C. 









































where Y and C are the GDP and currency, while  b is the income elasticity. The correction 
basically deflates the wrong ratio between the official and unofficial output, that we obtained 





















The corrected results normalized by the formal GDP in real terms (2000=100) stabilize around 




In this paper, we used the currency demand approach to obtain a measure of informality in 
Romania from the first quarter of 1998 until the four quarter of 2008.The informal economy 
grows constantly during 1998-1999 until it reaches its maximum at the end of 1999(38.12% in 
1999Q2).Then, it decreases slowly and stabilizes around 27% of official GDP. 
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Table 1: The description and sources of data 
 
Table 2: Analysis of stationarity
376 
 
Above it is presented the ADF test- one-sided p-values. * means stationary for the level of 
significance of 5%.The lag length was chosen using Schwarz Information Criterion. Null hypothesis: 
variable has a unit root. 
   
                                                       
375 All variables are in natural logs and seasonally adjusted using the tramo seats method. 
376 Following Giles (1995), the problem of non-stationarity is important also the cointegration of time series. To 
discover  the  order of  integration  of  the  time  series  used  we  apply  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  (ADF)  Test.  In  the 
following table the p-value of ADF test is reported, and therefore a value greater than 0.05 indicates non-stationary 
time series. The econometric software Eviews 6.0 was used to perform this analysis.  
Variables
375 
Description  Sources  Unit root 
analysis 
 
Natural  logarithm  of  currency  in  circulation 
normalized by GDP deflator. 1998Q1-2008Q4 
in national currency(mil.RON) 
Eurostat-Quaterly National Accounts 
and Monetary Statistics  I(1) 
  Natural  logarithm  of  1 M .1998Q1-2008Q4  in 
national currency 
National Bank of Romania, Monthly 
Bulletins 2000-2009  I(1) 
  Natural  logarithm  of    real 
GDP(2000=100).1998Q1-2008Q4  in  national 
currency(mil.RON) 
Eurostat-Quaterly National Accounts  I(1) 
TAX  Natural  logarithm  of  1+total  of  tax  revenues 
over GDP.1998Q1-2008Q4  Eurostat- Quaterly National Accounts  I(1) 
R  Natural logarithm of the 1 year nominal saving 
deposit interest rate.1998Q1-2008Q4 in %  Eurostat-Interest rates  I(1) 
WAGES  Natural  logarithm  of  the  ratio  of  wages  in 
GDP.1998Q1-2008Q4 in % 
National Bank of Romania, Monthly 
Bulletins 2000-2009 National Institute 
of Statistics, TEMPO database 
I(1) 
Test  Variables 
    TAX  R  WAGES 
ADF-Level 
None  0.9983  0.8404  0.7367  0.3518  0.7458 
C  0.9999  0.9647  0.2233  0.6381  0.5311 
T&C  0.0031*  0.0000*  0.9909  0.9379  0.9123 
ADF-First difference 
None  0.0561*  0.0000*  0.0000*  0.0005*  0.0162* 
C  0.0124*  0.0001*  0.0000*  0.0083*  0.1943 
T&C  0.0038*  0.0004*  0.0000*  0.0270*  0.0000* 
ADF-Second difference 
None  0.0000*  0.0000*  0.0000*  0.0000*  0.0000* 
C  0.0000*  0.0000*  0.0000*  0.0000*  0.0000* 







Table 3.Analysis of Cointegration between Causes and Indicators 









(0.060)  -3.8005  0.99 
Note: The critical values of the ADF test’s t-statistic are taken from Engle and Yoo(1987).For a sample with 
50 observations and  for  a  number  of  four  variables,  they  are:      4.61(1%  level),    3.98  (5%  level)    and 
3.67(10% level). The order of autoregressive correction has been chosen using the AIC as suggested by 
Engle and Yoo (1987, pg.16).Thus, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 10% level for residual 
t e .The p-values of the parameter estimators are given in parenthesis. 
 
Table 4. Johansen Cointegrating Test 
Null Hypothesis    5% Critical Value  1% Critical Value 
       
Trace statistic test 
 
   
None**   119.4171   76.07   84.45 
At most 1**   70.72629   53.12   60.16 
At most 2**   43.74119   34.91   41.07 
At most 3   18.05864   19.96   24.60 
At most 4   5.194495    9.24   12.97 
       
Max-Eigenvalue 
Statistic Test   
   
None**   48.69083   34.40   39.79 
At most 1   26.98510   28.14   33.24 
At most 2*   25.68255   22.00   26.81 
At most 3   12.86415   15.67   20.20 
At most 4   5.194495    9.24   12.97 
 
*(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5 %( 1%) level.  
Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels.  
Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at both 5% and 1% levels. 
Given the small size of our series we used a maximum of two lags running the tests. 




Estimated Matrix of Adjustment Coefficients 
         
0.103  0.144  0.052  -0.206  0.131 
(0.109)  (0.060)  (0.035)  (0.526)  (0.023) 
Standard errors in parentheses 




C D Y D TAX D R D WAGES D